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Introduction
Krista K. Thomason

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the canonical figures in

the history of philosophy, and Groundwork for the Metaphysics ofMorals
is one of his best-known works. It is required reading in many philoso
phy courses, especially those that cover moral philosophy. And for good
reason. The Groundwork introduces some of Kant’s most famous contri
butions to moral philosophy. Here, Kant articulates his arguments about
moral duty and human dignity, ideas that have become influential both
in the history of philosophy and more widely in our everyday thinking.
Kant’s book, however, does not make for easy reading. He uses
technical language and, moreover, appears to presume that readers of the
Groundwork are familiar with his other treatises, thus giving the impres
sion that they have walked into his arguments in the middle rather than
at the beginning.
Our hope is that this edition eases some of the struggle. It is aimed
at those who have not encountered Kant previously and may have little
acquaintance with philosophy. In other translations, notes provide back
ground context or define an unfamiliar term. Ours also do so, but they do
more. They guide the reader through the text, providing a companion to
help make plainer some of his dense language, remind the reader where
Kant is in his arguments, and offer examples that make concrete some
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of his more abstract ideas. In this way, we seek to remove barriers while
encouraging readers to do their own interpretative work.
Before approaching the text itself, let us consider its context: The
Groundwork was published in 1785. It appeared four years after Kant’s
masterpiece Critique of Pure Reason (or first Critique) and twelve years
before the Metaphysics ofMorals^ the book whose groundwork it is sup
posed to establish. Because the Groundwork references the first Critique,
a few words about that book are helpful.
In it Kant provides a close examination (a “critique”) of the discipline
of metaphysics, the study of the nature of reality. According to Kant,
that study was in crisis, having been attacked as useless, misguided, or
even harmful. Kant wants to defend the discipline while convincing the
traditional metaphysicians that they have approached matters in the
wrong way. Central to Kant’s project is determining the limits of reason.
Traditional metaphysicians beUeved that using only their reasoning pow
ers, they could reach conclusions about the most far-reaching subjects,
including the existence of the soul, the structure of the universe, or the
nature of God. Kant argues that reason cannot prove anything one way
or the other about such matters, but it can nevertheless play an important
role in expanding our knowledge of the world.
According to Kant, one reason traditional metaphysicians believed
they needed to resolve the most fundamental matters is because they
believed morality to be at stake. They believed that morahty had to be
based on the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. Kant, how
ever, denies this connection and seeks to explain the relationship between
traditional metaphysics and morality. This question is the starting point
for the Groundwork, where Kant takes his readers through a progression
of reflections about morality. Beginning with what ordinary people
believe, he proceeds to offer a philosophical account of what morality is
and what it requires of us.

VIII

Introduction

Even though he resists the idea that we need to work out all our
metaphysical questions in order to answer moral questions, he is sym
pathetic to the methods of traditional metaphysics. In the Groundwork,
Kant often speaks of the need to do “pure” philosophy that is devoid of
“empirical” elements, which are derived from experience.
To see why, let us consider one of Kant’s own examples: What does
it mean to be a good friend? We can go about answering this question
in different ways. One approach would be to consider all the available
examples of friendship. According to Kant, this method would be
empirical. Yet it has flaws. First, we have no reason to think that our
examples of friendship are good, not bad. Second, we need criteria to
know that a friendship is good. How do we determine the criteria? We
cannot do so by surveying all our examples of friendship. That method
would be akin to deciding the definition of a good film by watching
innumerable films.
Imagine instead that we surveyed what people think. Yet people
are sometimes mistaken about the nature of a good friendship. Thus
we would learn from a survey only what people generally believe about
friendship, not what constitutes the actual nature of a good friend
ship. Suppose we asked only wise people. This method looks like an
improvement because we would be less likely to receive bad answers.
Yet how do we decide who is a wise person? We would need to know
what makes a person wise. Thus, for Kant, the empirical method seems
to lead us in circles.
To determine the essence of a good friendship, we need to think
about the definition of a good friendship, which, in Kant’s view, is the
territory of the metaphysicians. How do we develop a definition? We do
what the metaphysicians do: reason about the matter and try to deter
mine the essential characteristics of a good friendship. This is the process
Kant uses in the Groundwork to examine the nature of moraUty.

IX

Introduction

Consider the opening lines from Section 1:
Nothing in the world, or even beyond it, can possibly be con
ceived and be called good without quaUfication other than a
goodwill. Understanding, wit, judgment, and other talents of the
mind are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects, as
are the qualities of temperament such as courage, determination,
and perseverance. But both (the talents of the mind and the
qualities of temperament) may also become extremely bad and
harmful if the will that utilizes these gifts of nature, and whose
constitution is thus called character, is not itself good.
How does Kant arrive at this claim about the good will? In spite of unfa
miliar language, Kant’s reasoning is rather straightforward. Imagine that
someone asks you what makes a person good. You might initially think of
a list of good qualities or traits. Perhaps you believe that courage makes
someone good. Then you consider, for example, a courageous supervillain
from a comic book, who clearly is not a good person. The goodness of
some qualities or traits seems to depend on the goodness of the person to
whom they belong. Being a good person, then, must be something other
than just having the right kinds of traits. Whatever “good” means, it has
to be (in Kant’s terms) good without qualification; it cannot be the sort
of thing that can be used in bad ways.
Here we are using the same method that the metaphysicians use.
We start with some possible claims. We then try to critique them by
identifying their flaws. We switch back and forth between the role of
defender and the role of attacker. We do so until we develop claims
strong enough to withstand most criticisms. This kind of reasoning does
not require us to introduce any empirical element. No data would tell us
what is good without qualification. We might begin, as Kant does, with
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examples of good people and good things familiar to us. But we only use
those examples to help craft our definition. To develop it, we leave the
examples aside and focus on the definition.
The Groundwork proceeds precisely along these lines. In the first
section, Kant concludes that whatever “morally good” means, it must be
something that is good unconditionally. He suggests that the good will
fits this description. All the good qualities and traits we might think
of would not be good if they were not in the possession of someone
who has a good will. If this claim seems right, then trying to determine
what a good will is seems to be the promising next step to figuring out
what morality is.
What makes the good wiU good? According to Kant, central to our
understanding of the good will is the concept of duty. Someone tvith a
good will does the right thing because it is the right thing to do. Again,
Kant thinks a little reflection will prove this point. Imagine two people,
both of whom decide to help someone in need. One person explains her
actions by saying simply that it was the right thing to do, so she did it.
The other person explains that she was hoping her actions would make
her famous. Clearly, Kant thinks we judge these two cases differently. The
second person has, at best, mixed motives, which makes a difference to
us; we do not consider her a moral exemplar even though she ended up
doing something good.
We can grasp the idea of acting from duty when we realize that
people can do what is right even when they do not want to do so. Think,
for example, of a whistleblower who informs the public about the unjust
or criminal activity of her employer. She might lose her job; she might
be buUied and threatened; she might have her entire life turned upside
down. Although she did not want to reveal what she knew, she might
reasonably explain that she had to because she felt it was the right thing
to do. Against aU her desires and interests, she did what was right.
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How is this idea possible? From where does this special motivation
come? How do we know our duty? According to Kant, our experience
with human beings will not answer these questions. In fact, experience
would tell us to be pessimistic about this picture of morality. Most people
act from mixed motives if they manage to do the right thing at all. Yet, as
Kant points out, experience is irrelevant when we think about morality.
We are considering what we ought to do, not what we in fact do. Notice
the uniqueness of such thinking: We are reflecting about what we should
do, not what we have done, are doing, or will do.
How are we capable of such reflection? Our closest analog is fol
lowing a law or a command. Indeed, Kant thinks this approach should
seem familiar to us. Return to the example of the whistleblower—she
might feel as though she had to reveal what she knew, as though her
conscience was commanding her. We often experience morality in the
form of strong prohibitions. If morality acts like a law, it is not a law
like any with which we are familiar. Kant thinks it doesn’t come from
the state or from God. Instead, it’s a law that we give ourselves, coming
from our own reason.
In other words, reason grasps the moral law and motivates us to
follow it. What does the moral law command us to do? Kant claims that
we can’t rattle off a list of specific actions, because morality commands
us universally. When I think of something that I morally ought not to
do, I believe it’s not permissible for anyone to do. Morality applies to any
and all creatures capable of reason, but we all And ourselves in different
circumstances. Therefore, the moral law must be general enough to issue
commands regardless of the differences in our lives. Such is how Kant
arrives at his famous formulation of the moral law (what he calls the
“categorical imperative”): Act only on those maxims you can at the same
time will should become universal law. When I’m deciding how to act, I
ask myself a very familiar question: What if everyone did this?
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According to Kant, that the moral law applies to everyone also helps
us understand what our relationship to each other should be. Morality
dictates that when I act, I take into account all my fellow rational crea
tures. Again, Kant believes this concern will be familiar to us. Most of
our moral actions involve respecting other people. We shouldn’t lie, cheat,
steal, or harm others. We can imagine our fellow humans raising objec
tions: “What if we did that? If you don’t think we should be permitted to
lie or cheat, then why should you?” We are all, as Kant puts it, “ends” to
each other. According to Kant, we see ourselves and aU our fellow ratio
nal creatures as bound by the same moral law. We are all part of the same
moral community (what Kant calls “the kingdom of ends”), in which we
aU have an equal voice.
This conception of morality is discovered by using the methods of
the metaphysicians. Having done so, Kant faces one final question: Is this
scheme possible? Perhaps he is right that duty, the categorical imperative,
and the kingdom of ends are the right way for us to think about morality.
But is it actually so? You can imagine the metaphysicians reading the
Groundwork and anxiously awaiting the answer to this question. They
will likely be disappointed with Kant’s answer. Just as he argues in the
first Critique, if the metaphysicians are looking for a speculative proof,
they won’t find it. Nevertheless, Kant thinks that metaphysics confirms
what common understanding believes.
Return to the example of good friendship: We can develop a defini
tion of a good friend, a standard by which we measure our friendships. If
part of being a good friend is being loyal, we will expect our friends to be
loyal, and we will be hurt or disappointed if they are not. Even if almost
no actual friendships meet our expectations, Kant thinks this condition
won’t affect the correctness of our definition. The same is true of moral
ity. Acting from duty and respecting others is morally required even if
fulfilling those obligations is difficult. Moral life is hard, and people are
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imperfect. That we don’t always do what is right doesn’t affect the right
ness of what we ought to do. At the same time, we know what is right
and that we ought to do it. Yet we also know that many people—even
most—fail. Yet neither of these judgments weakens the other.
In other words, we stand between two worlds. In one, we know,
thanks to reason, what the moral law requires, and we know that we are
capable of following reason because we are free. In the other world, we
are tempted by all manner of inclinations to do what we want rather
than what is right, and often those inclinations win. Kant believes that
we undeniably occupy both worlds. But being a good person requires
that we believe the first world can and should influence how we behave
in the second.
This conclusion reveals much of what is at the heart of Kant’s moral
theory. We have to be comfortable living in the tension between the two
worlds. No one ever said that being a good person was easy. It requires
developing inner strength and good judgment, as we never know what
kinds of challenges we wiU face. We wiU likely be tempted to act against
duty because doing the right thing often requires us to relinquish what
we care about or speak up when doing so isn’t popular. We are obligated
to respect other people even when we may not fike them or prefer to do
otherwise. In the Groundwork, Kant seeks to convince us that we already
know what is right and that philosophical reflection confirms our out
look, bringing it into sharper focus. Once we possess that clarity, we can
use it to strengthen our resolve and our commitment to acting morally.
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